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The study surveys the institutional similarities and differences between 
the centre and the periphery of EU in budgeting. The hypothesis is that the periphery 
of the EU is not only imitator of the centre budgeting practices, but also innovative 
in application of new elements, items or instruments in the institutional aspect.  
In most of the industrialized countries, there are many factors ruining 
fiscal sustainability beside the climate change costs. The aging population, the 
welfare state reform, the recovery from global crisis, the tax competition, the 
rigidities of labour markets already have resulted robust debt levels. (The 
approximately debt to GDP ratios have been the followings in 2011: USA 100%, 
Japan 225%, France 80%, Germany 75%, Britain 70% etc. source: Eurostat). The 
high developed countries have trouble with the general budget balance. Besides, the 
primary gap indicator even represents a longer term fiscal adjustment period 
necessity for these countries. Especially the big key economies (USA, Japan, 
Germany, France, UK) must face to drastic return to balance during decades after 
many years of fiscal stimuli. The global crisis of 2008-2010 caused a serious turmoil 
in many EU states’ public finances. Only six EU countries could keep the deficit 
criterion in 2009. Four of them (Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Bulgaria) have not 
introduced the euro. The other countries have diverged both in debt and deficit. 
Since 2010, during one and a half year many euro zone countries had difficulties in 
debt financing (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain). Some euro zone members also 
have got closer to non-credible indebtedness (Italy, France).  
The study will analyze the need of fiscal institutions for solving 
sustainability problems in EU member states. The rule based budgeting sets the 
framework of fiscal responsibility through the rules of procedures and transparency 
and the mechanisms of supervision and sanctioning. The applied frame of fiscal 
responsibility should be built from these rules and mechanism specified for the 
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country characteristics. The rule based fiscal policy decreases the political decision-
makers’ room for manoeuvre, their discretional steps, and builds such mechanisms 
into the budgeting that can close significantly out the possibility of “human 
intervention”. Instead, automatic stabilizers are applied, what means revenues and 
expenditures depending on business cycle, as they strongly correlate with the 
economic growth, consumption, export, investments etc. 
There are fiscal councils existed already before the crisis 2008, like 
Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark etc. But the crisis also implied the 
necessity of creation of councils, like the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council or the 
Romanian Fiscal Council. Or, contrary, the political interest changed, weakened the 
function of certain institutions, like the case of Hungarian Fiscal Council. 
2. Rules after crisis 
The fact, that many European countries have been facing to the risk of 
debt crisis after financial markets became undersupplied with money in the financial 
crisis of 2008, is the result of undisciplined fiscal policy making in the previous 
decades. This meant particularly ignoring the existing fiscal rules (expenditure caps, 
deficit limits, debt limits) and the introduction of veto-like institutions which serve 
the long term fiscal sustainability target against the short term political interests of 
the political decision-makers. 
In advance, it must be stated that fiscal rules them-self can not be the 
trigger of long term balancing if strong political commitment exist only in speeches 
without actions. Benczes (2011:601) gathered the immense number of numerical 
rules adopted by European countries since 1990. His conclusion is that the main 
argument for national fiscal rules was the accelerating growth speed of public debt. 
Thus, mostly those countries introduced fiscal rules intensively, whose debt 
exceeded the 70% GDP-ratio. Typically, low ratio countries increased their 
indebtedness in the pre-crisis period of 1990-2007. Moreover, the countries aspired 
for euro-zone membership in the 1990s and that was why they reduced their debt 
level, after accession their debt level started to rise again, except the Netherlands 
and Finland. (see Mosley 2004:188, fig.1) 
The damages caused by the global financial crisis in the credibility and 
solvency of European countries can turn again the focus of fiscal policy makers 
toward application of rules and strong political commitment, just like it has 
happened in Greece and Italy through resign of prime ministers and choosing 
technocrats for this position. 
The economics literature on fiscal discipline emphasizes the importance 
of exit strategy from debt problems and the necessity of rules. Blanchard, Cottarelli 
and Vinals (2010) gathered the characteristics of the effective exit strategy, as 
follows: (1) integrated cooperation of policy making institutions, (2) flexible 
permanent adjustment in the strategy, (3) restoring the market role in the financing 
of public debt, (4) unambiguous communication of fiscal actions. They also warn for 
good timing of stopping the fiscal stimuli. They assert that “[e]nsuring fiscal 
sustainability is a key priority and policy challenge, notably in light of the upsurge 
debts in many countries .” 
What type of rules should be revived? Blanchard, Cottarelli and Vinals 
(2010) suppose country specific debt target (for high developed ones 60% of GDP, 
for emerging ones lower than 60% as prudent level of debt), and structural primary 
surplus.  Besides they miss the detailed fiscal reporting, the broad fiscal risk 
analysis, the comprehensive, medium term, obligatory budget framework, the 
numerical and procedural rules, the independent budget agencies in most of the 
countries.  Their opinion is that more rigorous top-down budgeting approach could 
have been higher guarantee to the implementation of fiscal adjustment. However the 
process of budget planning is top-down, the “rigidities and circumvention of the 
budget process diminish its disciplining impact.” Their thesis is that the non-devoted 
implementation endangers the credibility of fiscal adjustment and political 
commitment. (Blanchard, Cottarelli and Vinals 2010:17-18) 
Hallerberg and Scartascini (2011) view the budget institutions as part of 
common pool resource (CPR) problem, as the spending ministers are interested only 
in the highest magnitude of financing and taxation on own field of competence, and 
the regional representatives and MPs only in their own region. That is why the two 
experts prefer the centralized budgeting which is realizable through three ways: (1) 
numerical rules, (2) procedural rules, (3) transparency rules. 
Schick (2010) hopes, that after the crisis, the governments are willing to 
create much “sturdier” rules than before. He mentioned three approaches on fiscal 
rules. The first one supposes to wit for normalization of economic circumstances. 
The second one urges the budget balancing (in a non-keynesian way) for economic 
growth. The third one wants to change the fiscal rules, as the pre-crisis rules failed 
because those were too rigid and unable to adjust to the changing business 
environment. That was why the old rules were pro-cyclical in growth years and 
resulted austere policy in recession times. Schick assumes that after the discretionary 
stimuli of 2009-2010, there is need for a discretionary consolidation before returning 
to fiscal rules. Schick’s recommendations for renewal of rules are the followings: 
- The primary rule should be the debt limit beyond the deficit limit as debt 
target expresses the long term characteristic. 
- The budget balance and items must be understood broadly including the 
extra-budgetary and off-budget funds and items.  
- The new generation of rules must contain the ability of counter-cyclical 
impact. They must force the budget institutions to generate surplus adequate to 
reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
- Namely, the rules should prescript limits to the structural measures. 
- The rules should be trend based, i.e. the limits should be able to shift 
according to the GDP-trends or budget revenues, thus making the rules counter-
cyclical. 
- Independently from the characteristics above, it is preferable to have 
rigid expenditure rules for easy implementation and exclusion of rule circumvention. 
- National rules are better than international (like the monetary and 
currency unions), as community rules must be uniformed, thus simple and rigid. 
However, national rules are more vulnerable by the majority of national parliaments. 
- Regional and local governments can weaken the debt consolidation of 
central government. That is why limits and rules must be included into the existing 
institutional framework, and extended to the lower levels of governance. (framework 
based rules) 
According to the flexibility, Creel and Saraceno (2010) modified the so 
called ‘golden rule’ of budgeting, namely the principal saying that only investment 
with income multiplying effect should be financed from credit and loan, but no 
current spending. Admitting the correctness of golden rule, the authors modified it 
with the “cyclically adjusted net-of-public-investment deficit”. 
DEF = DEFcyc + DEFstruct ;   (1) 
where DEF is the overall deficit, DEFcyc is the cyclical component of the 
deficit, DEFstruct is the structural component of the deficit.  
DEFcyc = -0.5 * OG * GDP ;    (2) 
DEFstruct = i*Bt-1 + Ipub + DEFD&A ;   (3) 
where OG is the output gap, i*Bt-1 is the interest rate burden on debt 
issued in the past, Ipub is the public investment, DEFD&A is the deficit component 
from discretionary and autonomous decisions. The rule is the following:  
DEFstruct - Ipub = 0   ;     (4) 
The modified golden rule:  
DEFD&A  = - i*Bt-1 ;     (5) 
Namely, the higher interest payable means lower deficit based on 
discretionary and autonomous decisions. Moreover, if the balance (actually surplus) 
of discretionary actions offsets the interest payable, namely their sum is zero, than 
the overall balance is the following composed from equations (1), (2) and (3): 
DEF = Ipub – 0.5 * OG * GDP ;   (6) 
In this case the multiplying impact of public investments would make the 
output gap to go toward zero (lim OG  0), since public investment to GDP ratio 
would start to decline by the investment multiplying impact. Finally, the overall 
deficit would start to diminish and logarithmically the public debt, too.  
3. Supervising fiscal institutions 
Blanchard, Cottarelli and Vinals (2010) establish that the strong budget 
institutions can improve the fiscal balancing performance by identifying the needful 
magnitude of budget adjustment, and creating and implementing credible 
consolidation strategy. 
Schick (2010) outlines three ways to enforce the budget targets, limits and 
rules. The first one is the automatic recurring process of setting targets, 
implementing the plans. This is actually the system of automatic stabilizers with the 
weakness of no protection against political motivation for discretionary actions. The 
second way is the enforcement by a supranational/international organization. In this 
case, the international practice shows serious problem of information asymmetry 
and weak ability to impose sanctions. The third one is an empowered independent 
national agency (a fiscal council) which can have impact on processes, and 
according to its own macro forecast, warn for dangers and call for adjustment by 
relying on its own public credibility. As it is worded in IMF (2010), there is need for 
fiscal agencies to hold the government accountable in the context of targets, policies 
and plans.  
In the followings, it will be surveyed from case studies, can the fiscal 
councils can strengthen the fiscal discipline, what are the weak points of such an 
institution. Besides, European practices appear in updated context. 
The Fiscal Council (FC)2 is an advisory body in budgeting question which 
is preferable to have independence from other government institutions, professional 
reputation and credibility. Its role is to assess fiscal targets, to assess appropriateness 
and soundness, to help policy makers reduce debt and see future risks, and to 
improve transparency of national budgeting. FC can have impact on fiscal decisions 
if its opinion is very credible and accepted by the public, thus setting pressure on 
political decision makers to change unsustainable fiscal objectives or actions. FC 
must analyse any budget-related proposals and estimate its impact on budget balance 
and public debt. It is also called a watchdog on budgeting. 
Lars Clamforce, former head of Swedish Fiscal Policy Council defined 
the personal criteria and the institutional tasks of an FC as follows (Clamforce 
2010a): The members of the FC must be independent from political actors, 
especially from the government. They must come from the academic sphere with 
high reputation. The academic record and the reputation can be the only guarantee 
for primacy of professional aspects beyond political ones. An academic expert is the 
less likely to risk his reputation and long term academic career for political 
“bribery”. (Of course, it is neither an absolute guarantee.) The tasks of an FC are the 
provision of objective macro forecast based on budget proposals, the costing of 
government initiatives, the ex ante and ex post evaluation, the sustainability analysis 
and the normative recommendation for policy making. 
3.1. The etalons  
3.1.1. Practices of federal states 
Where the regional, provincial, local governments are strong, the central 
(federal) government alone is not enough to sustain the fiscal discipline and the 
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solvency of debt financing. Thus it has been almost natural and automatic that some 
kind of body for reconciliation of regional budgets must be set up. 
The best practice for federal fiscal supervisory body is the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office making politically neutral, objective analysis on 
budget impacts to support the economic decisions of the U.S. Congress since 1974. 
Besides, other international imitating examples can be found for this type of FC 
motivated by federal coordination problem, just like the Australian or the Canadian 
Parliamentary Budget Office since 2011, the National Assembly Budget Office in 
South Korea since 2003. 
There are several European examples, too, for body of federal budget and 
debt coordination. In Denmark and Belgium, there is a strong sub-national regional 
governance level which has significant influence on public expenditures, but the 
central government limits are not valid on it. The central government is under 
pressure to make agreement with the regional and local governments. In Denmark, 
there is annual agreement. In Belgium, the situation is more complex, as this is a 
federal state. 
The Belgian regional governments has right to reach the so called ‘natural 
debt’ level, it looks reasonable. In practice, it means free deficit financing for 
regional budgets. The result was permanently excessive general (federal) deficit. 
This regional freedom, also, generated moral hazard. To treat the problem, the 
federal and regional level in agreement created the High Council of Finance (HCF). 
(Stienlet 2000) The HCF has issued every year an advisory report on necessary 
financial actions of several public institutions (central government, regions, social 
care systems, local governments etc.). Besides, in advisory report, it can recommend 
the narrowing of indebting of public institutions, if the measure of indebting 
endanger the EMU-related Belgian objectives, or can cause disturbance in financial 
balance, or ruins the structural fiscal balance. In the HCF, the members are the 
minister of finance, the delegated representatives from the ministry of finance, of 
economy, of social affairs, the National Bank, the committee of banking, the Office 
of Central Economic Planning, the regional governments, and other financial 
institutes. Besides, there are also financial, economic and taxation experts in the 
HCF. The HCF does not issue normative proposals on economic growth, but sets 
guidelines on general objectives of the formation of fiscal policy. The HCF is an 
advisory body, thus the implementation of its recommendations is voluntary for the 
fiscal institutions. 
Similarly to the HCF, in Spain, there is the Fiscal and Financial Policy 
Council (Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financiera Financial). The creation of the 
Spanish council was reasonable, as the tethers related to fiscal revenues have been 
significantly redistributed toward the regional self-governments since 1988, thus, 
since 2000, the regions decide about bigger amount of public finances than the 
central government. (Quintana és Torrecillas 2008)  
The German Federal Republic is actually the most centralized version of 
the federal state. The federal member states (Bundesländer) have own budget, but 
the so called Financial Planning Council (Finanzplanungsrat) harmonize the 
budgeting among the different levels of governance. Since 2002, the Council has the 
task to enforce fiscal discipline in the federal member states. Actually, the council is 
responsible for preventing the fulfillment of Maastricht Criteria to be endangered by 
federal member states. (Lübke 2005) 
Austria created a special version of FC with 14 members in 2002, the 
Government Debt Committee (Staatsschuldenausschuss). Even though officially it is 
a government committee, the construction is a clear example for federal 
coordination, as out of the members six are delegated by the federal government, 
three by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, three by Federal Chamber of Labour, 
and one-one by the Austrian Association of Municipalities, the Association of 
Austrian Cities, and the Conference of Provincial Governors. The Committee gets 
analytical support from the National Bank of Austria. 
(http://www.staatsschuldenausschuss.at) 
The federal-like FCs typically can not meet the condition of independence 
from other political actors, as their function is to coordinate among different 
political decision levels and dimensions. This is natural, since their way of 
efficiency is not to put pressure on government through the public and market 
opinion by relying on their own professional reputation and credibility, but to 
reconcile the rationalities of different levels of competences. 
3.1.2. Watchdogs: Dutch and Swedish innovative best practice 
For watchdog characteristic, the innovative best practices in Europe are 
the Dutch and Swedish FCs. 
As an institutional regulator, in the Netherlands, the Budget Inspectorate 
and Budget Directorates have been created. The inspectorate surveys every 
expenditure of spending ministries, budget proposals, and the background of 
policies. The directorates are responsible for finances of ministries and ministers’ 
proposals, and negotiate with the ministry of finance. (Blöndal & Kristensen 2002) 
In the Dutch system, the 23 different spending themes are separately proposed to the 
Parliament. The budget must contain: objectives, ways, costs. It is monitored by the 
state audit office. There is, also, an independent institute in the Netherlands, the 
‘Centraal Planbureau’ (its official English name: Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis) which analyze the economic factors affecting on the public 
finances. (Debets 2007) 
The Swedish FC was created relatively late in 2007 as a part of very 
disciplined, automatism based Swedish budgeting framework, but it became the 
ideal European version of FC in practice in the context of independence, credibility, 
professional reputation, methodology of ex ante analysis, influence on budgeting 
through pressure on government by shaping the public opinion. The Swedish model 
is defined by itself in the following way:  
“The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council [Finanspolitiska rådet] is a 
government agency established on 1 August 2007. The Council consists of six 
members and is assisted by a secretariat with four employees. The mission of the 
Council is to provide an independent evaluation of the Swedish Government´s fiscal 
policy. The council assesses the extent to which the Government's fiscal-policy 
objectives are being achieved. These objectives include long-run sustainability, the 
budget surplus target, the ceiling on central government expenditure and that fiscal 
policy is consistent with the cyclical situation of the economy. The council also 
evaluates whether the development of the economy is in line with healthy long-run 
growth and sustainable high employment. Additional tasks are to examine the clarity 
of the Government's budget proposals and to review its economic forecasts and the 
economic models used to generate them. Finally, the Council should try to stimulate 
public debate on economic policy.”  (website of the FC 
www.finanspolitiskaradet.se) 
Although Calmforce (2010) reports on political intentions to neutralize or 
terminate the FC in Sweden, the Council has reserved its competences, legitimacy, 
credibility, reputation and independence. 
3.1.3. Political death of a watchdog: bad practice of Hungary  
The ‘Fiscal Council’ has been introduced, as an independent institute for 
surveying, monitoring, analyzing anything, that related to public finances. The 
council could also make economic surveys and forecast, and evaluate budgetary 
proposals. The Council was composed from three independent economists with high 
professional credibility and reputation, and their job was helped by own Secretary 
Office ready for economic analysis and forecast.  Namely, the state of FC in 2010 
was very similar to the Swedish FC. This could have been the parallel best practice 
of FC together with the Swedish one, if the politics would not have interrupted the 
story. 
After one year of promising formation of Fiscal Council (FC), the 2/3 
majority of the government party in the Parliament dismantled the analytical 
institutional capacity, and restructured the three persons board. Instead of three 
independent experts, the head of State Audit Office (SAO), the chancellor of 
National Bank of Hungary (NBH) and an independent president compose the new 
version.  Thus the FC president with international professional respect in field of 
budgeting (George Kopits) got into an impossible situation. Without independent 
analytical capacity, the transparency analysis of the public finances is not any more 
trustable for the markets. He resigned, and the current head of the state – who was 
delegated by the qualified majority of the government party – nominated a new 
president to the FC. Not the person of the new president(s) is incredible but the 
process of restructuring. Legally everything was correct, but the market actors, the 
international partners will not any more consider the new version of FC to be a 
credible watchdog monitoring the fiscal policy. Damage in credibility results less 
transparency in budgeting for the bond market. 
In November 2010, the Hungarian governing party proposed a budget cut 
for the Fiscal Council. 825.5 million HUF was taken and only 10 million HUF 
remained, what forced to make the analytical staff redundant as a first step. This was 
a punishment, as few weeks earlier the FC criticised in budget and the lack of fiscal 
transparency.   
By liquidating the independent analytical capacity and professional 
credibility, the institutional factor of fiscal discipline got a serious damage. Besides, 
the ministry of finances got assimilated into the ministry of national economy, thus, 
the responsibility for fiscal discipline got degraded to state secretary level inward the 
government. The Fiscal Council has formally kept without secretary office for 
analysis and credible independency. The FC can build on the analysis of NBH and 
SAO. However, latter two institutions has no veto, the SAO makes only ex post 
analysis on public finances, and the NBH first of all prefers monetary targets. 
Although the government achieved improvement in the short term budget 
balance, the weakening of agencies with credible publicity or influence on decisions 
will have the public finances to move away from transparency and sustainability. 
Albeit politicians are able to stop the increase of debt, but only in case when it 
endangers directly their position, and right on time they return to discretionary 
easing if it serves better their short term political interest. Even though the State 
Audit Office and the National Bank continues the macroeconomic analysis, same 
time with elimination of FC’s analytical capabilities, the competence on long term 
analysis of fiscal risks was not entrusted to somebody else, but it simply disappeared 
from the institutional framework. 
Of course, transformation of FC will not shut the voice of rating agencies 
in the financial markets. The actors of bond markets still listen to the institutions of 
transparency, even though without credible FC this transparency got reduced. 
Not only the Hungarian FC had to face with political challenges in its 
existence. Clamforce (2010a), former president of Swedish FC wrote that 
independence and survival of FCs are frequently endangered by political decision 
makers, as criticism by a credible and public opinion leader FC on the budget-
related political actions ruins the credibility and popularity of politicians. This 
watchdog behaviour is mostly sensitive for the governing parties, as annual budget 
act depends on their objectives. 
3.2. Newly established fiscal watchdogs in Europe: 
Imitating practices in the EU 
The newly established European FCs are the result of global financial 
crisis 2008, more precisely its spill-over resulting increasing indebtedness and the 
threat of a debt crisis. 
The proposal for British Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) was a 
very quick reaction for budget deficit running out of control. In the end of 2008, the 
Conservative Party, still in opposition, proposed this agency. The realisation of the 
proposal could happen in 2010. (http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/)  
The OBR is not the Swedish like watchdog in the sense, that in the public 
administration hierarchy it is subordinated to the Treasury.  True, that OBR declared 
the classical watchdog tasks, just like forecasts for the economy and public finances, 
judgement on progress towards the Government’s fiscal targets, assessment on the 
long-term sustainability of the public finances, scrutiny on the Treasury’s costing of 
Budget measures. Clamforce (2010b) considers that “a number of established 
principles for such bodies were actually violated.” His critics on dependence 
between OBR and Treasury are based on the situation that some Treasury employees 
have been working for the OBR, the rules afford to the OBR to "consult the 
chancellor in preparing documents”. Besides, it is mentioned also as a sign off 
dependence, that “there is a built-in flaw in its forecasting tasks. By providing a 
forecast and a judgment on the fiscal outlook at the same time as the budget is 
published, it would seem impossible to avoid behind-the-scenes "negotiations" on 
numbers with the Treasury.”  Calmforce (2010b) emphasizes that credibility and 
reputation of a watchdog agency can not afford any opportunity of behind-closed-
door contacts and interlacement. His proposal is to isolate the OBR and the Treasury 
in physical, personal and operational sense. 
Fiscal Council of Romania (Consiliul Fiscal) was established in March 
2010 by the fiscal responsibility law (legea responsabilităţii fiscal-bugetare, legea 
69/2010). As members of the council, there are five academic professors with 
relevant background on macroeconomic and budgetary policies. They are nominated 
by Romanian Academy, the National Bank of Romania, the Academy of Economic 
Studies, the Romanian Banking Institute and the Romanian Banking Association, 
and elected for nine years by the Parliament. This process of nomination strengthens 
the credibility and the independence of the FC. For independent analysis and 
opinion, the FC has the Secretariat of the Fiscal Council, which will operate within 
the Romanian Academy, and prepares analysis, forecasts and documents underlying 
the opinions, evaluations and recommendations. The Secretariat employees can be 
10 persons who are chosen by the FC members.  Namely, the Romanian FC imitates 
the original best practices of Swedish watchdog etalon, thus this is itself an example 
for good practice, too. (www.fiscalcouncil.ro) 
The creation of Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) connected to the 
Irish banking crisis and its side effect, the 31.3% budget deficit in 2010. It was 
internal and Community level demand, to improve the prudence, transparency and 
discipline of the Irish budgeting after all. So, in June 2011, the IFAC started its 
operation. The institutional standards are very similar to the Swedish watchdog type 
council model. It has own secretariat for analysis and five council members from the 
academic sphere, just like in the Romanian FC. The objective of the IFAC is 
determined in the following: “The role of the Council is to independently assess, and 
comment publicly on, whether the Government is meeting its own stated budgetary 
targets and objectives. It measures the appropriateness and soundness of the 
Government’s macroeconomic projections, budgetary projections and fiscal stance. 
The Council will also examine the extent of compliance with the (forthcoming) 
legislated fiscal rules.” (www.fiscalcouncil.ie) 
The Public Finance Act legislated by the Slovenian Parliament in 2009 
prescribed the establishment of the Fiscal Council in Slovenia what was launched in 
March of 2011. (Fiskalni Svet) Tasks are very similar to the previous watchdog 
agencies. There are seven members from academic sphere nominated for five years. 
(www.fiskalnisvet.si) 
There are some initiatives waiting for realization in Europe. In June of 
2011, The Bulgarian finance minister announced the creation of Fiscal Board. 
(Novinite 2011) But there has been no any progress since the announcement. In case 
of Slovakia, the proposal of fiscal council appeared in a Discussion Paper of 
National Bank of Slovakia. (Horváth & Ódor 2009). The Portuguese government 
created a working group in January of 2011 for a later creation of Fiscal Policy 
Council. It is called Fiscal Policy Council Working Group (Conselho das Finanças 
Públicas Grupo de Trabalho). Until January of 2012 there has been no progress in 
start-up of the independent fiscal agency. (www.cfinpub.org) 
4. Conclusions 
The financial crisis of 2008 raised the fear from great depression. That 
was why European governments launched fiscal stimuli never seen before. The 
magnitude of public spending and the narrowing of bond markets took these 
countries close to a serial of debt crises. The conclusion of theorists and policy 
makers, too (see: formation of Euro Plus Pact), is that national budgeting should 
return to discipline, transparency, sustainability and credibility. The helpers to the 
mentioned objectives are the fiscal rules and watchdog agencies. About the fiscal 
rules, it is established that the post-crisis rules must be cyclically adjustable and 
country specific. In case of fiscal councils, there is a tendency in practice can be 
followed in Europe that application of such watchdog institutions is spreading as 
they can offer higher transparency of national budget. This is appreciated by the 
financial market actors. Of course, these helpers can not be effective without the 
strong commitment of policy makers. 
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